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**Liberal vs. libertarian Leviathan, or Predator vs. Alien in a critical theory of state failure:**

**Analytical implications for global governance**

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# **Liberal vs. libertarian Leviathan, or Predator vs. Alien in a critical theory of state failure: Analytical implications for global governance**

## **Introduction<sup>1</sup>**

The title of this study calls for an explanation and that is what I shall begin this introduction with. On the one hand it's reference to the study by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, 'Liberalism and Security: Contradictions of the liberal Leviathan' (Buzan and Wæver, 1998), which is relevant here as far as its implications regarding liberal democracies, reacting to the threat of state failure in a 'securitising mode' – especially since September 11, 2001 –, are concerned. On the other hand it's reference to the late Dutch libertarian thinker Michael van Notten's provocative essay, which controversially described the Somalia of the 1990s as a near-kritarchy, a libertarian almost-Paradise, thus offering a radically different option for the conceptualisation of what is usually described as a 'collapsed state' (van Notten, 2000).

Hence in the formula put forward in the title we have Buzan and Wæver's liberal Leviathans, liberal democracies, facing, during the course of their attempts at state-building, van Notten's libertarian 'states' or Leviathans, which to them pose a threat of several kinds. Of course, if some may perceive there to be a dichotomy or even a zero-sum game in the relation between liberalism and the state and thus find the expression 'liberal Leviathan' controversial, the term 'libertarian Leviathan' contains an unquestionable contradiction between adjective and noun.

Nevertheless it may be useful to consider the liberal vs. libertarian formula, for it illustrates how far we have moved away from the picture of the world held by the traditional realist paradigm of IR theory, the picture of a world of states having the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within their boundaries, being able to act as a unitary actor in their relations with the outside world – the other states –, ensuring their survival according to the logic of self-help. A world of Leviathans or Leviathan-clones.

The following study will attempt to integrate the problem of state failure, which, as demonstrated, is a challenge for IR theory, into an English School-'international sociological'<sup>2</sup> framework. I will also endeavour to provide a theoretical construct of the discourse on state failure, meaning the '*discourses*', as used by Foucault<sup>3</sup>, of the discourse as polemic.

The other formula included in the title, 'Predator vs. Alien', is already a forecast of this latter endeavour. The 'Predator' here is essentially a caricature based on the negative

definition by neo- and post-marxist thinkers of liberal democracies as powers willing to re-colonise states in the ‘underdeveloped’ world that they selectively declare ‘failed’. The ‘Alien’, the libertarian Leviathan, is called what it’s called here for two reasons. Firstly, the optimistic libertarian vision of human beings, which would render possible the transformation to a libertarian order, falls quite far from the pessimistic vision of human beings nurturing realist thought. Secondly, it is alien because the problem of statelessness for IR theory – meaning more unambiguously the theory of interstate relations which is based on the premise that there exists a system of states extending globally – is difficult to internalise. Thus the formula ‘Predator vs. Alien’ also refers to the relation between the two being one of an asocial nature. The two players act as if they were waging a war of extermination against each other (although the same relation in the film ‘Alien vs. Predator’, at least from the part of Predators breeding Aliens for the coming-of-age hunt, gets a social dimension as well)<sup>4</sup>.

A thorough conceptualisation of ‘state failure’ may make it clear to us why the relation between our Predator and the Aliens is so antagonistic. I may shed light on why state-building may be one of the most important institutions of today’s society of states. And the way that institution is shaped by different streams of thought holds important lessons for global governance.

In the first part of this study, however, I will first look at the way the threat of state failure – the threat of the ‘Alien’ – came to be constructed within liberal democracies, with special regard to the Anglo-Saxon world.

### **The construction of the threat**

Kaldor states that ‘It could be argued that if September 11 had not happened, the American military-industrial complex might have had to invent it. Indeed, what happened on September 11 could have come out of what seemed to be the wild fantasies of 'asymmetric threats' that were developed by American strategic analysts as they sought a new military role for the United States after the end of the Cold War’ (Kaldor, 2001). In this form the statement may seem quite radical, but what Kaldor means by this most of all is that strategic analysts are deeply affected by, and thus interested in, the process of securitisation: meaning the process by which certain existing threats become defined as such socially. It does matter to them what comes to be defined as such.

Securitisation theory, as elaborated by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, points to the process of securitisation being one of an inter-subjective nature. Its dynamically changing

outcome is a matter of varying degrees of social consensus about the reality of a threat. Security experts, strategic analysts, as well as decision-makers, are of course prime securitising actors, who can shape the outcome more than others. They have large influence over defining what referent object is threatened by what. If they succeed in convincing the public, securitisation may take place, coming with the acceptance of the potential need for extraordinary measures in the face of what has been defined as a threat. If we were to know the real degree of existing threats, we might talk of their social perception thus taking up a given position on a scale ranging from complete negligence to baseless panic (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1997, as well as Buzan, 2004b).<sup>5</sup>

When such a complex phenomenon as state failure becomes a near-priority on the list of security threats, it also matters a lot how it is conceptualised. It is quite typical in Western decision-makers' current use of the terms 'failed states' and 'state failure', that there appears reification, meaning that they seem to handle these terms as if they would have a self-evident meaning, when for instance the word 'failure' might have a great number of interpretations. In addition, expressive slogans are in use that betray with somewhat more accuracy the nature of the threat posed by state failure, but there is still a great deal of simplification and distortion in them. UK foreign secretary Jack Straw used for instance the expression 'the coming of a new Afghanistan' [= the vision of new September 11s] (Straw, 2002).

To proceed, I will now, instead of a methodical content analysis for lack of space, simply list here the bunch of threats associated by analysts with the emergence of state failure. Hence, on territories not under the sufficient control of any state, 1) we might see transnational terrorist and criminal groups finding a base for themselves; 2) the production of narcotics; 3) in these areas epidemics, potentially turning into a worldwide pandemic, might spread easily; 4) ecological disasters may come to happen that might have global implications; 5) and from these territories waves of refugees might start towards neighbouring and even more distant countries (See Maass and Mephram, 2004:11-12; Wise, 2004:1-11. The threat of epidemics mentioned by e.g. Urquhart, 2004. The ecological threat mentioned by e.g. Watson Institute). Refugee waves are also one of the potential factors in regional destabilisation, the latter meaning a multiplication of the original problem in the spread of state failure, in connection with which the literature on the subject talks of 'spill-over effects' (CGDev, 2004:1), 'spawn conflicts' (Rice, 2003:3) and 'the dangerous exports of failed states'(FP-FFP, 2005). The U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002 and the European Security Strategy of 2003 both reckon with the majority of the threats listed here.<sup>6</sup>

On that now those, listed above, are treated as serious threats, certain events of the near past had a significant impact. Spectacular terrorist attacks on the one hand, and the SARS epidemic or the fears about a mutation of the bird flu virus, leading to a global pandemic, on the other hand, all served to bring it home, so-to-say, that unstable areas of the world are, as a result of processes connected with globalisation, not on the ‘periphery’, but in a kind of global neighbourhood that is more and more interconnected, and thus instability in those areas poses more of a threat to the world in general, too. This had a significant impact on the securitisation process.

9/11 in particular may be called a turning point. Prior to that, state failure research had a predominantly humanitarian character. Simplifying what changed, researchers used to ask primarily ‘Why is state failure bad for *them?*’, for the people living *there*, interpreting it only indirectly how state failure might have negative external effects, or ‘why it might be bad for *us?*’. A good example<sup>7</sup> of that is the pioneer State Failure Task Force (today called the Political Instability Task Force), which started its work in the middle of the 1990s, at then-vice president Al Gore’s initiative and with the support of the CIA. They identified state failure with four different types of event: ‘ethnic wars’, ‘revolutionary wars’, ‘adverse regime changes’ and ‘genocides or politicides’ (Goldstone et al.). One might suspect in the background of this research the growing interest in the U.S. towards internal armed conflicts in the post-bipolar world – the interest growing in part exactly because of the Cold War having ended.

That there followed, after 9/11, a securitisation of the issue of internal armed conflicts – often termed ‘civil wars’ rather unfittingly universally –, conflicts that used to be studied with mainly humanitarian motives throughout the 1990s, is not that surprising. As the case of the State Failure Task Force might show, from the start such experts and state organs came to be preoccupied with the issue – mobilising resources to study it, or, rather, keeping those resources mobilised at the end of the Cold War – that were in the position to set the security agenda later on.

The problem is that there is still much confusion regarding terminology. This may be observed in the changing usage of the term ‘failed states’ – which has, by way of excluding groups of ‘non-failed’ states from enquiry on the basis of different selective principles, always opened up the possibility of ideologisation a lot more than talking of state failure as a phenomenon –, resulting in its turning into an intellectual dustbin. Into this dustbin now every state problematic from a Western point of view may fit, as exemplified by a joint study of the

British Institute for Public Policy and the German Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, which treats even the term 'rogue state' as a synonym for 'failed state' (Maass and Mephram, 2004:5).

Outlined here is thus the picture that in reaction to the emergence of a real threat there has started a threat construction process which now allows for manipulative uses of the dominant terms of the discourse (e.g. to justify military aid to authoritarian regimes in the name of stabilization or to justify intervention in or stop aid altogether to weak countries citing the lack of sufficient governing capacities as the reason), as well as for exaggerated response (e.g. decision-makers might honestly think that from now on any emergence of state failure shall trigger direct intervention).

Outside the Western world this doesn't encounter undivided welcome. I would illustrate this with two examples. Indian researcher Raja Mohan sees in the discourse on state failure, and specifically in relation to Pakistan, the chance for one of the options of manipulation cited above, namely that when American scholars describe Pakistan as failed, failing or at risk of failure, they indirectly justify all forms of U.S. aid, including military aid, to Islamabad. Thus we have the seemingly unlikely situation that an Indian scholar defends Pakistan in his study, stating that in fact the regime there is stable (Mohan, 2004-05).

As far as the Chinese perspective is concerned, about that it betrays a lot that when the United States Institute of Peace attempted to organise a conference jointly with the Chinese Institutes of Contemporary International Relations on the possible forms of Sino-U.S. cooperation on the problem of failed states, a divergence of views regarding proper terminology came to the fore. The significance of that the formerly 'anti-imperialist' Chinese side agreed to the idea of the joint conference is not to be missed, but they insisted on dropping the term 'failed states' from official texts, preferring the expression 'areas of instability' instead (Gareth and Adams, 2004:1).

Moreover, the term 'failed states' has Western opposition, too. In some cases its use is even a taboo, for example for such Western-dominated intergovernmental organizations as the members of the World Bank Group. The latter reserves a special category for countries performing badly economically, where some form of political tension is also present, namely the LICUS (Low-Income Country Under Stress) ranking. Condition for qualification is falling below the lower per capita income cut-off level of the International Development Association and performing badly according to World Bank governance indicators (World Bank, 2002:3). A Western example of non-governmental opposition could be a study by Uniya, an Australian Christian NGO, that deemed the usage by the Australian government of the term 'failed state'

manipulative, stating that it served as part of the justification sought for intervening in the Solomon Islands (Nguyen, 2005:8-10).

### **Conceptualising the threat**

Something that can be viewed as advantageous in the new, post-9/11 interpretation of state failure, even with the chances of manipulation existing, is the honesty in it about the security considerations and the interests motivating research on the phenomenon, that may subsequently clarify the concept.

In an earlier study I presented a dual conceptualisation of state failure, reflecting the dual nature of research outlined above. Doing so I came up with one ‘security policy-oriented’ and one ‘humanitarian’ concept, or as I put it back then, one concept from the global, external perspective and one from the local, internal point of view. (Marton, 2005:2). Here an updated version of these follow, in a detailed manner.

According to the security policy-oriented definition, I talk of state failure where the internationally recognised government of a country doesn’t exercise sufficient control over its internationally recognised state territory, and so it fails in its chief function from the external point of view, defined, for the purpose of analysis here, on the basis of a norm of cooperative sovereignty: namely, that it is responsible for maintaining sufficient control over the portion of world territory that falls under its sovereignty. The internationally recognised government (**IRG** from hereon) is thus unable to prevent the emergence of **negative (external) spill-over effects (NSEs)**, negative external security consequences essentially, from its territory. In the case of such IRG deficiencies the use of incentive or deterrent means by the actors of the outside world can’t get the IRG to prevent or stop those NSEs (hence the threat is ‘**indeterrable**’). By the ‘outside world’ we may mean all states on the planet, a group of states or even a single state that sees damage from NSEs. And finally, by ‘NSE’ we may mean potentially all of those threats listed in the previous part of this study (think of the ‘coming of the new Afghanistan’ slogan), as well as some more. It is imaginable for instance, that a guerrilla force in one country may take advantage of the weakness of a neighbouring country’s central government and the subsequent political vacuum on the latter’s territory, to establish rear-bases in the relative protection of internationally recognised state boundaries. Or, it is also imaginable that pirates may have safe havens along an insufficiently controlled coastline. And still there are possibilities left to ponder. It might be perspective-widening for instance, to break away, in connection with the threat of epidemics, from our preconceptions

about lethal, rapidly killing viruses like that of SARS, and substitute into our formula slowly killing, but nonetheless rapidly spreading ones like HIV, or not a virus, but bacteria, like TBC-strains that are resistant to most known antibiotics.

To accurately express what I mean by the term ‘indeterrability’, I should draw attention to the issue of government recognition. The present global state system ideally would function so that the list of IRGs and that of the telephone numbers belonging to each – referring here to Henry Kissinger’s famous question about the EU’s telephone number –, would be enough to control the problem of state failure by providing easy access to competent, able leaderships in every corner of the world. For instance, should there appear a terrorist training camp in Country X, and assuming the benevolence of Country X’s leadership, it would be enough to dial the right number and ask the people there to set about making that camp disappear. That is to say that Country X’s leadership is capable of **credible commitment** [with regards to the latter concept and its significance in European state formation, see Spruyt, 1998 – a must]. When Country X isn’t capable of that, it might be for several reasons of course. Some IRGs are weak to act even in the absence of armed challenge. In other cases it is an armed force other than that of the IRG that controls the given territory, from where NSEs, harmful to the outside world, emerge. Thus, perhaps the term ‘IRG-failure’ may be more accurate than ‘state failure’.

However, re-conceptualising the security policy-oriented definition, the phenomenon I describe by it may also be interpreted as the failure of the global system of states – and its ‘functionally alike units’<sup>8</sup> – in exercising control over the whole of world territory: as ‘*state system-failure*’. Unfortunately though, here again, the use of the word ‘state’ draws attention away from the recognition problem. For instance, in areas that are firmly controlled since decades by an armed faction other than the IRG, one that there provides acceptable governance and aims at establishing constructive relations with the outside world, one should not speak of indeterrability, since there is whom to deter. Jeffrey Herbst talks, in connection with this, of ‘legal blinders’, and that ‘the standard international legal practice almost always equates sovereign power with control of the capital city’ (Herbst, 2004:302).

Based on non-realistic assumptions of an ideal global state system and its ideally functioning IRGs, and ignoring that what was said above, one may conclude about the territory of failed or collapsed states, or areas within a state that are not controlled by an IRG that these have much in common with the high seas, that they are quasi-‘*res omnium communis usus*’ (territories not falling under any state’s sovereignty) – the only difference being that they are in fact protected by a kind of *fictional* sovereignty. Here again is the image

of the Alien, arrived at from a different angle. The fiction of the libertarian Leviathan, re-emerging this time as a result of the pro-IRG partiality of the state system. This partiality can lead to problems during the course of and after interventions, when groups, distortingly called ‘sub-national’, may declare their demand for independent statehood. Or, another illustrative example of the problems stemming from the effect of legal blinders, is how problematic it was after the tidal wave disaster that hit Asia in December, 2004, to provide aid to ‘rebel-controlled’ areas, for instance in Sri Lanka or in Aceh in Indonesia.

Moving on now, after having clarified the security policy-oriented concept in detail, I shall also discuss the humanitarian concept of state failure. Coming up with a humanitarian definition may occur in several ways. Rotberg, for instance, draws up a continuum along which a country may move from ‘strong’ status, through ‘weak’, ‘failing’ and ‘failed’ to ‘collapsed’. He unfortunately doesn’t differentiate between problems of insufficient or incomplete territorial control and that of weak government performance or the insufficient provision of ‘political goods’. For his one-dimensional approach he thus draws latent criticism from Jenne, who points out that this would allow for treating North Korea and Sri Lanka in the same category (Rotberg, 2003:2-10, Jenne, 2003:222-223).

The main problem, however, is perhaps that the ‘internal perspective’ makes it necessary to come up with normative statements regarding the desirable quality of the state, in much more detail than does the security policy-oriented concept. This implicitly or explicitly means taking as the basis of such considerations an ideal model-state, which rather inevitably results in Euro- or West-centrism.

With regards to this problem, but rather instinctively than consciously, in an earlier study cited before I defined the state as the chief means for the population of a given territory of ensuring stable, reliable life prospects for the long run – and state failure as that when a state fails in this chief function (Marton, 2004:134). I did so on a Hobbesian basis. But exactly based on Hobbes’ concept of the Leviathan and thinking of what might go wrong with it, one can get to theoretical possibilities that show I wasn’t able to exclude ideological influences even by the means of deliberate under-conceptualisation.

If we imagine what might be non-optimal about the operation of the Leviathan, we get four options: 1) it may be too strong, in which case the state itself makes life prospects non-reliable, by its violent arbitrariness; 2) two or more Leviathans may fight for the control of state territory, which is probably the case of what might be called a ‘civil war’ or internal armed conflict, although a persistent division of state territory is also imaginable in a frozen conflict, without continuous fighting; 3) if the Leviathan is too weak, then unmitigated

miseries of life, corruption and organised and unorganised forms of crime might be a source of uncertainty; 4) finally, it is a theoretical, rather than a practical, possibility that any Leviathan may be absent altogether. This last one could be van Notten's libertarian order, in connection with which even he doesn't claim that that's what we would have found in the 1990s in Somalia. Thus we may not have to reckon with the fourth option practically, even if some authors seem to do just that, at least implicitly, as I noted above. It is perhaps a greater source of complications that the first option shows strongly authoritarian rule as being the equivalent of state failure, from which the universal need for democracy promotion may stem. The first person to protest that would probably be Hobbes himself, who, in accordance with his vision of 'the state of nature', was ready to welcome even such authoritarian rule as preferable to the possibility of civil war (Hobbes, 1970:145-149). Still, other scholars, such as Nicholson, seem to be following a logic similar to mine. Even though Nicholson stops short of calling states providing their population with 'coercive stability' (as opposed to 'consensual stability' provided by democracies), 'failed', he, since coercion means state violence, acknowledges that it might constitute too much of a failure in guaranteeing individuals' physical security. His benchmark for judging the latter is a critical thresh-old of 'the probability that a new-born infant will reach a suitably advanced age and then die of 'natural causes' (Nicholson, 1998).

Nevertheless, the humanitarian version of the definition of state failure is, unfortunately, less objectively researchable and less objectively operationalisable. The notion may be simply too wide to really benefit analysis, with low income countries, civil war-torn countries and countries ruled by strongly authoritarian regimes all falling within its category. Still we can't just ignore it, though. One reason is that the issue of refugees shows the most clearly that the 'humanitarian/security policy-oriented' differentiation in research approach cannot be perfect. That the risk of NSEs is likely to be higher in countries where the population doesn't have stable, reliable life prospects, is a plausible hypothesis indeed: to put it bluntly, in refugees' case, they themselves are negative external consequences and the indicators of a humanitarian crisis simultaneously. Another reason why humanitarian considerations matter in research on state failure is that we shouldn't regard as healthy a country where the central government hardly produces any public good at all, even if there are no NSEs affecting the world outside, from its territory.


It is a problem, however, with the definition of the state and its failure in the case of the humanitarian approach, that the state-as-the-solution, as outlined above, wasn't chosen by its own population in much of the post-colonial world, but by the former colonists and thin

elite layers of ex-colonial populations – and in many cases it didn't function as such. Finally, it should also be remarked, that to treat state failure exclusively as the state's failure, e.g. in the case of wide-spread poverty, is to ignore the interdependence of today's global economy, to name just one of several structural factors that ought to be taken into account.

**NSEs, interdependent security, and global governance**

A conceptualisation of state failure focusing on NSEs is, as I pointed out already, built on treating a co-operative interpretation of sovereignty as the norm (equalling it with shared responsible control of world territory). Any counter-argument, that it is not actually the norm of the day, is welcome – I'm merely saying that it *could* (and, to a degree, should) be the norm, in the ideal world of credibly committing IRGs described in the previous section.

As a result of globalisation our world has become highly interdependent, not only in an economic but in a security sense as well. It is in such a world that the need for stable states with competent leaderships to cover for the entire world territory becomes evident. With the high level of interconnectedness *Country X* might spend whatever great amount of money on its security – it will not be able to preserve it if meanwhile *Country Y* is a totally dysfunctional state which operates as fertile ground for NSEs of one kind or another (see *Figure 1*).



**Figure 1. States as building blocks**

In the absence of a world state – the starting point of any conversation on the issue of global governance – the existing states are meant to serve as building blocks of global stability. Assuming the highest attainable level of universally even interconnectedness, physical proximity will be an irrelevant factor in affecting the probability of NSEs from a dysfunctional state, such as *Country Y*, reaching *Country X*. Wherever *Country X* is, NSE are going to reach it, if not directly, then indirectly, through a shock effect felt across the entire system.

That's how interdependent security works. We can point to several analogies to better highlight the essence of this sort of security interdependence. The study by Kunreuther, Heal and Orszag (2002) on security challenges faced by companies in the airline industry is one very good example of such an analogy. They point to the example of Pan Am flight 103 that was blown up over Lockerbie, Scotland. The luggage containing the bomb didn't go through Pan Am's quite reliable screening system – it came transferred from another flight. So Pan Am lost an airliner effectively due to another airline's lax approach to security (p.2.). Several other analogies that one could mention include interconnected computer networks such as the Internet itself, where one insufficiently defended computer might be a threat to the entire network, for the chances are that it might more easily be bot-infected and controlled by malevolent third parties looking to send out spam or destructive worms from it. And so do people, who are not vaccinated against infectious diseases, increase the risk to their entire society – the risk of those very diseases spreading around and eventually evolving, through mutation, into a threat even to the vaccinated part of the population (to which the old vaccination no longer provides protection).

With regards to the latter two parallels I have drawn, it may be pointed out that the higher the amount of sufficiently protected units is, the lower the level of threat is to the entire set of units. This holds for security interdependence in the case of states, too. Epidemiologists have a name for what I'm talking about here: that is 'herd immunity'. To give you an example of the practical implications of the concept, it is when there is a drop below the herd immunity threshold of a population, against diseases that people only get vaccination for in times of a major epidemic, that those diseases return again and again – e.g. that is the case with meningitis in countries across Africa's Sahel region that make up the so-called 'meningitis belt' (see e.g. WHO, 2003). Thus, building on the concept, we may say that state-building, as well as measures aimed at strengthening states and their governance in general, have as their purpose achieving a kind of herd immunity. The best of cases would be, of course, if such herd immunity could reach a hundred percent. If, however, a large number of states are non-functioning units, in the sense that NSEs emerge from their territory, that doesn't bode well for overall global stability. This is where state-building comes in as part of a kind of world-policing function of global governance.

It's not difficult at all to read out theoretical underpinnings of such a conclusion from the literature of international relations. For instance, Rosenau talks of the two worlds of world politics, a state-centric and a multi-centric world, and the clear contrast he sees between the two. Relations in his state-centric world are mostly based on reciprocity. Within its stable

frameworks for interaction, clearly definable ‘events’ take place. On the other hand the multi-centric world is a context of action where states are only one of the parties involved. A large degree of spontaneity creates turbulence within this sphere, and, instead of events, one is perplexed by a multitude of ‘cascades’, or cause–consequence chains that are beyond the control or even the comprehension of any of the actors that are a part of them. States may thus feel the need to co-operate more, to mitigate shock effects of spontaneity in the multi-centric world, for their collective sake. Where the successful reconstruction of states is at stake, one may conclude that there is a zero-sum game in the works between Rosenau’s two worlds.

In essence it is the latter, worried view that may explain the emergence of the so-called post-modern imperialist stream of thought. ‘The premodern world is a world of failed states’, Robert Cooper writes, of the states of much of the post-colonial world (Cooper, 2002:16). ‘All of the world’s major drug-producing areas are part of the pre-modern world. (...) If non-state actors, notably drug, crime, or terrorist syndicates take to using pre-modern bases for attacks on the more orderly parts of the world, then the organised states may eventually have to respond. If they become too dangerous for established states to tolerate, it is possible to imagine a defensive imperialism. It is not going too far to view the West’s response to Afghanistan in this light’ (Cooper, 2002:16-17). Fukuyama echoes the same, when he talks of the need to ready ourselves for more frequent interventions in the ‘failed state part of the world’ (Fukuyama, 2005). And so do others such as Mallaby, who talks of the emergence of a kind of ‘reluctant imperialism’ (Mallaby, 2002), or Fearon and Laitin, with their description of neo-trusteeship as something providing for potentially equal gains for every major power interested in global stability (Fearon and Laitin, 2004). In fact, neo-trusteeship is something for which the call has been made a lot earlier, by e.g. Helman and Ratner (1993), but on humanitarian grounds. That is the essence of the change: a shift from primarily humanitarian to security interests. Arguably, that is a change brought about in large part by the events of September 11, 2001, as I pointed out earlier. Post-modern imperialists do acknowledge, however, that – in Cooper’s words – both the ‘demand’ for and the ‘supply’ of imperialism is lower than what would be needed for a non-problematic implementation of the concept as policy.

### **The theoretical construct of a polemic**

After having discussed the post-modern imperialist stream of thought represented by the likes of Cooper et al., I still owe giving a more complete picture of the other streams present within

the discourse on state failure, something that a critical theory of state failure cannot leave aside. I will present a theoretical construct of the polemic, which means, that although it is based on actually existing, well-identifiable patterns of thought, or ‘paradigms’<sup>9</sup>, I’m not stating that everyone contributing to the actual polemic necessarily takes up one of the possible positions defined in the following scheme. Hybrid positions as well as inconsistencies are fully imaginable – even out of pragmatic considerations. (Then there is the special case of nationalist thinkers, who, according to their actual political situation and interests, may join the camp of historicists as well as that of statist, for reasons made clear later on.) It’s also important to note that inconsistencies and hybrid positions may be observable in states’ foreign policies as well, so the following theoretical construct may be useful in foreign policy analysis as well. Following here then is the outline of a debate deeply concerning the future of international society and its primary institutional arrangements.

One possible pattern for a classification of views regarding state failure to start with is asking if they are for or against intervention. On the basis of that we immediately get a surprising result, finding alongside each other, in the non-interventionist camp, a typically Eurocentric and a completely non-Eurocentric stream of thought.

(*Historicists.*) The followers of what I call the historicist stream attempt to set their analysis in an historical context, or, more exactly, they regard the occurrence of state failure as one point along a unilinear, universal development path. In this view state failure is a kind of necessary misery, or at least an inevitable one. ‘There is nothing novel about the phenomenon of state failure’ – claims Herbst, adding that even the European states of today have failed once or twice during their history (Herbst, 2004:303). Prunier and Gisselquist start their study of Sudan by declaring that state failure can be observed in the history of the Roman Empire, France and China, too, and thus ‘any discussion of how an African state has failed has to be carried out with these parameters in mind’ (Prunier and Gisselquist, 2003:101). Behind these views there are two main premises: 1) that in Europe the possibility of fragmentation led to the coming into being of stable nation-states, 2) that Africa’s future may be seen in Europe’s past, given that in Africa, the chief source of troubles is the instability of artificial states that were created upon decolonisation, preserving the ex-colonial administrative boundaries as state frontiers in accordance with the principle of *uti possidetis iuris*.<sup>10</sup> There are several quite expressive adjectives in use that refer to the artificiality of African states: quasi-states, juridical states as opposed to empirical states (Jackson and Rosberg, 1989; Woodward, 2002:5-6), or ‘might-have-been-states’. According to a radical statement cited by many sources, ‘African states are neither African nor a state’.

Of course, these premises can be criticised, and we may ask e.g.: 1) Do we really have only ‘nation-states’ in Europe today (especially with the ambiguity of the term ‘nation’ in mind)?; 2) How stable are these states (for instance in the Balkans)?; 3) Has there always been and is there today the possibility of fragmentation, meaning: has it always been and is it nowadays allowed to happen (for instance in the Balkans)?; 4) Where, and when, it did happen, how spontaneous was this process of fragmentation?, 5) Have all of currently existing European states really all come into being through a process of fragmentation?

Nevertheless, indirectly, on the basis of the premises cited, Herbst for his part makes the call ‘Let them fail!’, when advocating his version of a global solution. More exactly he adds that what we need is ‘to increase the congruence between the way that power is actually exercised and the design of units’ (Herbst, 2004:311). That’s why he advocates decertifying sovereignty in the case of non-functioning states together with conditionally recognising sovereignty in the case of fragment-entities providing stability and acceptable governance to their population since a reasonable amount of time – for instance in the case of the former British colonial territory of Somaliland within Somalia (Herbst, 2004:314).

Although Prunier and Gisselquist mention China, too, among their examples with which they back up their hypothesis, there can not be mistaken a degree of Eurocentrism in their thought. The Eurocentric line of thinking they join, as well as its historical antecedents, are analysed extensively by Heydemann. Heydemann claims that in the background of a whole series of research programs since the 1960s, one can identify as a key purpose the intention to preserve Europe’s intellectual influence over its former colonial territories by providing them with recipes of development theory and modernisation. That was the case when in 1969 the Social Science Research Council’s Committee on Comparative Politics, with the aim to do something against the marginalisation of Europe in comparative studies, asked Charles Tilly and other scholars to look into the possibility of using European state formation as a model for the rest of the world. Tilly caused disappointment when he drew attention in his work to the significance of the connection in European history between state formation and the long series of wars states have waged during its course (instead of emphasising more noble ideas). Notably, he also produced an analogy about the difference between historians and political scientists/development theorists, according to which historians are like a dog on a leash tied to a tree, always obediently accepting their position, while political scientists are like the dog that would either break the leash or at least move the tree (Heydemann, 2000). In the volume, ‘Bringing the state back in’ Tilly writes that ‘The Third World of the twentieth century does not greatly resemble Europe of the sixteenth or

seventeenth century. In no simple sense can we read the future of Third World countries from the pasts of European countries' (Tilly, 1985:169). This might be especially important to note, for, despite this, Jeffrey Herbst refers to Tilly several times, to back up his own hypotheses about the connection of state formation and the occurrence of war (e.g. Herbst, 2004:303).

Meierhenrich represents more of a hybrid position. He, too, refers numerous times to Tilly and he, too, emphasises the macro-historical nature of state formation, but he does seem to readily accept ex-colonial boundaries and to think of efficient mediation and 'the creation of stakes' as the primary conditions for holding a state together (Meierhenrich, 2004). Thus he excludes the artificiality of ex-colonial boundaries from the group of factors possibly generating conflict, and takes the view, which may obviously be apologetic of the colonial heritage, that one might build states for any population, its composition notwithstanding. Hence he probably wouldn't let a state fail, or, more accurately, fragment, even after decades of negative experience concerning its viability.

*(Anti-Eurocentrics.)* Moving to the anti-Eurocentric stream sharing the slogan 'Let them fail!', it is the diverse stream of post-colonialist, tri-continentalist, post-marxist, cultural relativist and other thinkers, many of whom see the need for a kind of emancipation of different cultures. They mostly emphasise that the state is an institution that was exported to the non-Western world, forced on it – at least most of those states that were created at the time of decolonisation. Critical concerns have already been voiced in connection with the propagation of humanitarian intervention, that in fact it might be a sort of hubris from the part of the West when it wishes to take into its care these very states, in trying to save them, and in the background of that these thinkers have always tended to see a kind of re-colonisation with classic imperialist aims. In the maintenance of ex-colonial artificial boundaries that divide ethnic, religious and tribal communities and make it more difficult for nomadic peoples to continue with their traditional way of life, they see a structural form of violence. Or, even in the maintenance of states. One may fittingly quote Frantz Fanon here: '...let us not pay tribute to Europe by building states, institutions and societies which draw their inspiration from her [...] If we want to turn Africa into a new Europe [...] then let us leave the destiny of our countries to Europeans. They will know how to do it better than the most gifted among us' (Fanon, 1965).

Such thoughts are not alien to Western thinkers, either. Huntington, for instance, argues in his famous book, *The Clash of Civilisations*, for the respect of a kind of 'civilisational' autonomy, equating universalism with imperialist tendencies (Huntington, 1998; p.548 in the Hungarian edition). Clapham, providing a picture in Africa of the lack of

pre-colonial proto-statehood (with some exceptions, but even there with major differences from the European experience), comes to the conclusion that ‘zones of statehood have to coexist with zones of less settled governance’ and that ‘attempting to restore universal statehood is chimerical’ (Clapham, 2004:78). With regards to Somalia, for instance, he wonders if the Somali proverb ‘every man his own sultan’ indicates that statehood may be totally alien to Somalis for it to be realisable in any stable way (Clapham, 2004:87).

With the latter thought, which basically stresses a kind of individual sovereignty, a number of libertarian thinkers sympathise. Most important among them is perhaps Michael van Notten, who, having felt disappointed by liberal democracy, decided not only to *voice* radical thoughts. His libertarian thinking eventually led him to Somalia, where he spent most of the latter part of his life, having even adopted a family there (Free-Market, 2002). Based on his experiences in Somalia he wrote his essay that I already mentioned, in which he describes the kind of system there, in the 1990s, as one mixed with libertarian and anarcho-capitalist elements, thus rather close to his heart (van Notten, 2002).

Van Notten’s essay is a good example that Western thinkers, when trying to describe what follows after a state collapses, strongly tend to look for reference points in Western political philosophy. Realist IR scholars talk about Hobbes, while libertarians turn basically to John Locke’s writings, using Locke’s version of the state of nature as opposed to that of Hobbes. (The idea that van Notten takes as the main characteristic of a *kritarchy*, that there sanctions shall only be imposed for breaches of natural rights and that anyone may be entitled to implement natural law, is taken from Locke [Locke, 1988:269-278 (4-16.)]).

For a criticism perhaps the first thing that should be voiced is that the Somali proverb quoted above (by Clapham), about every man being his own sultan, as well as the emphasis put on the significant role ‘wise men’ shall play, in van Notten’s essay, is not really acceptable from a feminist perspective. Individual sovereignty in this form, falling far from the libertarian ideal, may turn into male sovereignty. It is even more important perhaps, however, in relation to the subject of this study, that even if we were to accept that conditions in 1990s Somalia were better in one way or another for the people living there than for example during the time of Siad Barre’s dictatorship, such conditions, anywhere on Earth, may still be untenable because of their spill-over effects for the world outside.

*(Human rights universalists.)* Moving on to the interventionist camp, a dominant stream within it is that of human rights universalists, those ready to intervene for the sake of the universal application of human rights even in stateless territories, as well as those willing to intervene based merely on humanitarian considerations in general, without reference to

specific human rights. In connection with the rising to prominence of their view one has to emphasise the significance of two historical normative shifts, as so does Bain, too (Bain, 2003).

Colonisation has been legitimised in the past by ideas such as that of the ‘dual mandate’, as put forward by Lord Lugard (Lugard, 1922), according to which it was the responsibility of delivering civilisation to barbarian areas as well as to use the resources of those lands for the benefit of all mankind, that called on the West to embark on colonisation as a mission. By the time of decolonisation, however, these ideas have been largely discredited, with any form of colonial rule, irreversibly, it seemed, de-legitimised. The new society of states was ready to accept strongly authoritarian forms of rule within its new members (thus a form of barbarity). The new members were protected by the principles of territorial integrity and non-intervention (the latter often called the principle of ‘negative sovereignty’). That was the first major normative shift. In the 1990s, however, views emerged that we shall not tolerate anything. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated in his Millenium Report that no legal principle may shield crimes against humanity (Annan, 2000:48), while one of his former advisers, Mohamed Sahnoun has already been voicing that instead of the possibility of intervention we should rather talk of the ‘responsibility to protect’ (see e.g. in Sahnoun and Evans, 2002). The ‘responsibility to protect’ in 2005 has then been put on the UN reform agenda as well. This sort of activism obviously doesn’t prefer passivity in the face of the mass violations of human rights often seen in states that are called ‘failed’ – called failed in this case because they fail to provide ‘protection’ to their population in one way or another.

Intervention, however, often takes place in defence of minorities – which is a contradiction of the activism stemming from a basically individualist interpretation of human rights –, and then it may lead to a situation in which ‘the creation of stakes’, as Meierhenrich calls it, for holding a state together, could become close to impossible, and fragmentation may become hardly avoidable. A good illustration of these dilemmas is the case of Kosovo and the polemic surrounding its future.

*(Statists.)* There exists then a fourth, ‘statist’ stream of thought within state failure discourse, seemingly in complete contradiction with human rights universalists’ perspective. This is a complex stream, with at least two distinct camps within it.

A more traditional statist school of thought argues for the preservation of all internationally recognised states of today, as well as the preservation of their borders, accepting only the idea of interventions serving this very aim (thus interventions in the sense

of passively or actively assisting a government in the face of separatists). One of their chief arguments is that one of the stabilising pillars of the post-1945 international order is the non-changeability of borders on the basis of ‘ethnic’ claims of self-determination, or as a result of violence – with several exceptions, this principle has been largely consistently applied and thus stability arises from it. Hence if we let today’s states fragment, recognising new entities as states, by that we may contribute to a process of global fragmentation, or fragmentation ‘on a planetary scale’ (see e.g. Gottlieb, 1994:2 and 26; Boutros-Ghali, 1992<sup>11</sup>). In case Kosovo gains independence, they have a kind of domino theory to envision what would follow. Consequently, at this point their predictions go against the long run-optimism of historicists. Therefore traditional statist may regard as acceptable a great variety of means for the preservation of a state, and may show suspicion towards minorities’ political agendas. As it was stated by the Kenyan delegation at the 1963 opening meeting of the Organisation of African Unity, about great-Somali nationalism: ‘if they [Somalis] don’t want to live with us in Kenya, [...] they are perfectly free to leave us and our territory. This is the only way they can legally exercise their right to self-determination’ (quoted by Jackson and Rosberg, 1989:109). Population transfers of course inevitably go with a lot of human suffering, and subsequently may amount to a mass violation of (individual) human rights, which statist may accept in return for the stability they hope to be so created for the long run, as a collective good that is worth the sacrifice – at this point there is an obvious clash between them and human rights universalists.

Nevertheless, statism is not necessarily incompatible with the endeavour to, in the long run, turn states into neutral providers of human rights. Moreover, a statist stance may be actually better defensible, if it doesn’t come in one package with the aim of achieving ethnic homogeneity. In that case it might use the argument, against separatist demands, of the high unlikelihood that with the recognition of new entities or the modification of borders one could create ‘non-artificial’ states in the sense of their being ethnically homogeneous – especially in areas characterised by a mosaic-like ethno-geographic dispersion. Today you are the minority in our state, tomorrow we would be the minority in your state: that would be the only change – as one might paraphrase former Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov’s words (the original phrase quoted in ICG, 2004:4)<sup>12</sup>. Such, pro-human rights statism may be sensed for example in Bookman’s works, who argues for the ‘administrative disassociation between ethnicity and territory’ – not providing exclusive, territorial autonomy to ethnic groups –, for the sake of stability (Bookman, 2002:44). Following a similar logic, Gottlieb advocates a functional – as opposed to an essentialist – interpretation of borders and territoriality (Gottlieb, 1994:44-47).

The rise of another kind of statism was observable during the 1990s. I term that strain of statist thought ‘IGO statism’ (Intergovernmental Organisation statism). It doesn’t fall too far from the form of statism outlined in the previous paragraph, evident for instance in the World Bank Group’s research on civil war, led, among others, by Paul Collier. A dominant feature of the latter was what inspired scholars outlining a ‘new’ concept of civil war, according to which rebellion around the world is primarily found to be motivated by opportunity (e.g. opportunity through the weakening of a central government, the proliferation of small arms or the chance to acquire external financing) and greed (that of leaders as well as those being led), rather than objective collective grievances. Collier himself published a study with the title *‘Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity’* (Collier, 2000), which itself might immediately raise the suspicion of one-sidedness if we think of Charles Tilly’s famous essay and its title, *‘War Making and State Making as Organised Crime’* (Tilly, 1985). The interesting thing is that Collier takes an overall much more balanced view of non-international armed conflict. Still, his works provided a lot of inspiration to the sort of thinking emblematic of which is the ‘new war concept’. E.g. Mary Kaldor, among others, talks of the emergence of ‘new war’, by which term she means those armed conflicts that ‘are sometimes called internal or civil wars to distinguish them from intra-state or Clausewitzian war’; Kaldor repeats the rebellion–organised crime analogy and she, too, stresses the importance of opportunity vs. grievance (Kaldor, 2001). One may of course find changes in the nature of internal armed conflicts – sometimes not entirely internal conflicts, but in fact ones that are spilling over state borders as well –, just as the world has changed significantly in the meantime, but Kaldor’s conclusions still seem rather ideological.

According to the simplified concept of new war (which supposes there to have been an old and cleaner war), rebels have no ideology, no mass popularity, their use of violent means is characterised by randomness and brutality, plus their main source of income is looting and the extraction of natural resources they capture<sup>13</sup>. Numerous studies have since criticised the unacceptability of these views, given the lack of sufficient research which served as the basis for formulating the concept, the methodological errors committed in the research process, as well as the distorting – by the way Eurocentrically such – way of viewing history behind it (see e.g. Kalyvas, 2001)<sup>14</sup>. This, however, doesn’t change the fact that the endeavour to criminalise most forms of rebellion surfaced from quite a prestigious institutional source. Behind its emergence one may suspect the interests of a development IGO that by definition maintains relations mainly with IRGs and thus runs into frustrating problems at times when attempting to give assistance to countries destabilised by internal armed conflict. It was then,

when I arrived at the latter conclusion, that I started using the term 'IGO-statism'. To back it up, I may quote here Jackson and Rosberg, who accept that since decolonisation international organisations have served as 'post-imperial ordering devices' for Africa, while at the same time they stress that in their view, with the lack of traditions of statehood there, 'there was little choice but to establish independence in terms of the colonial entities' (Jackson and Rosberg, 1989:114 and 108).

I'm thus finished then with my overview of the different streams of political thought within the discourse on state failure. As it may already be evident, there is, encoded within these streams, their own version of a global solution to the problem at hand. Post-modern imperialists may for instance decide to take over Africa and run it themselves again, at least temporarily, out of the fear that leaving it self-destruct would put in danger our security, too. Human rights universalists, motivated by their humanitarianism, would tend to intervene in the protection of all minorities on the planet, while statisticians would put down every single revolt, no matter what it takes. Anti-Eurocentricists and historicists, finally, would vote for the *laissez-passer* approach for their part.

Further insight may then be gained about the relation of the different streams vis-à-vis each other if one ponders their possible attitude towards the necessity of democracy and the market economy, which of course already lets us drift towards the question of state-building. Historicists and anti-Eurocentricists might say 'no' to both democracy and the market economy, but historicists will do so only temporarily, expecting the 'developing' world, on the basis of their unilinear development hypothesis, to get to where the developed world is today (by tomorrow). Post-modern imperialists and human rights universalists both stand for the idea of democracy and the market economy, however, post-modern imperialists show more of a tendency, in the name of pragmatism, to forge a compromise about democracy. Cooper's remark that in the jungle we are supposed to be operating according to the laws of the jungle (Cooper, 2002:16). Finally, I have already referred to the possible ambiguities in statist thinking about the issue of human rights and, subsequently, democracy; as far as the market economy is concerned, the most positively approving view on that issue is held unquestionably by World Bank-type IGO-statism. It ought to be noted, though, that as far as such territories, that have become 'stateless' not as a result of internal armed conflict, but purely as a result of the weakness of an IRG, only anti-Eurocentricists and post-modern imperialists have a clearer answer, namely, respectively, that we have to either accept and live with, or panic because of and act against, the existence of such territories. This might illustrate the state-centricity of Western political thought.

On that note one should also remark then, that any research on ‘state failure’ shows statist tendencies, too, by coding a state’s weakness automatically as negative, and by seeing the solution to problems in the strengthening of states in one way or another. This statism, by the way, is not necessarily incompatible with the anti-statism of neoliberalism – the hegemonic ideology of our age, as many regard it (see e.g. Bienefeld, 2002) – and its existing practice. Neoliberal thinkers, save for some with libertarian or anarcho-capitalist inclinations among them, probably approve of the strengthening of states in their security-provider role, chiefly to facilitate the trouble-free operation of the global economy. But they will only do so without seeing a need to revise their ideas about the economy, the consequences of those ideas put into practice, and the selective way in which they are put into practice. This sort of approach might be endorsed by post-modern imperialists, whose aim might be interpreted as *correcting decolonisation to save globalisation*. We can hardly afford the luxury of selectivity in critical thinking, though, and may not be content equating state-building with the assignment of ‘night-watchmen’ to their post.

In a complex world one has to beware of accepting the idea that universal solutions might exist, and show caution and sensitivity to local circumstances. This, too, underlines the inevitable need for hybrid positions and inconsistencies in this wide and complex debate.

Finally, then, here follows an overview of the streams of thought discussed above, organised into a chart showing their stance concerning three key questions.

**Figure 2. Streams of thought in the discourse on state failure and their policy recommendations:**

	<b>Fragmentation, border changes?</b>	<b>Need for intervention?</b>	<b>Democracy, market economy – the desirable outcome?</b>
<b>Post-modern imperialists</b>	May have to be allowed	Yes, in our interest	If possible / Yes
<b>Human rights universalists</b>	May have to be allowed	Yes, in their interest	Yes / Yes
<b>Historicists</b>	Should be allowed	No – better for everyone in the long run	Temporarily not / temporarily not
<b>Anti-Eurocentrics</b>	Illegitimate not to allow	No – it’s illegitimate	No / No (at least not at Western instruction)
<b>Traditional statist</b>	Shall not be allowed	Yes, rebellions have to be put down	Maybe / Maybe
<b>IGO-statists</b>	Don’t have to be allowed	Yes, rebellions have to be ended	Yes / Yes

## **Conclusions – Lessons for global governance**

Processes constituting globalisation have created a world interdependent not merely in an economic sense, through the expansion of free trade, but one that's interdependent in a security sense as well. States are building blocks of global stability. As for units controlling parts of world territory bounded by internationally recognised borders, their IRGs (Internationally Recognised Governments) are meant to ensure that NSEs (Negative Spillover Effects) don't emerge from their territory. States, dysfunctional in the sense that their IRG is incapable of ensuring just that, pose a security threat by their very weakness, undermining other states' endeavour to ensure their own security. It is in that context that state-building has become an important institution of today's society of states. However, state-building, as I have attempted to show by shedding light on the complexity of the discourse on state failure, inevitably runs into a multitude of problems. The threat of NSEs works as an impetus for re-taking control over parts of the post-colonial world, and the latter attempt will almost inevitably run into resistance here and there. More importantly, in looking to find the right policy, one has to face such conceptual questions as whether and when intervention can be legitimate, whether fragmentation of currently existing states should be allowed or not, and what, in the case of a state-building venture, the desired outcome should be like (democracy?; what kind of democracy?; market economy? etc.). Rich democracies, seen oftentimes simply as the 'West', are ready to lead, but there are debates even within them as to when and what exactly should or could be done, and of course their leading role is being contested.

Managing a global process of fragmentation is something that many see as an inevitable task for global governance – e.g. Alger (Alger, 1998). There are those, however, some of them already quoted in this paper, who think the process, once started, could not be controlled, and would eventually result in the creation of a large number of non-viable states.

It is perhaps an even more important problem to see, though, that different kinds of NSEs are not evenly securitised in rich democracies that are setting the agenda of global governance. Terrorism, the drugs trade, or migration into rich democracies, are the issues getting most of the attention. And so a clear realisation, of the fact that NSEs tend to hurt low income countries the most, is lacking. From locust infestation to the spread of wheat stem rust, both helped by weak institutional response locally in the areas that are hardest struck, from waves of refugees to destabilising armed conflicts in the direct neighbourhood (see e.g.

Sesay, 2004), or the spread of epidemics from outbreaks of meningitis to the march of multi-resistant tuberculosis – all the threats listed here threaten poor countries the most.

State-building ventures are spectacular, arguably inevitable, but also very risky tasks to handle for global governance, and they are questionable in legitimacy. Global governance, or more concretely a global program which I term **CTR** (Cooperative Threat Reduction), with reference to the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme that did a lot to provide for sufficient control of the ex-Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal since the 1990s, could do well being complemented by less direct forms of assistance to weak states. There should, therefore, be more of a focus on support for the development of a whole series of global regimes from the Programme of Action countering small arms proliferation through the Global Rust Initiative to AIDS, TB and malaria relief. Of course, even more drastic measures could possibly be contemplated, such as a more radical structural adjustment of the global economy, e.g. through an adjustment of world trade, aid, and debt relief, to provide for a more just economic order, one that may mitigate the structural burdens weakening much of the post-colonial world. One has to assume, however, that the scale of response by rich democracies will always be dependent on the changing degree of securitisation, within them, of the different NSEs emerging from dysfunctional states.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> A version of this paper, with several different sections, has been published in: Marton Péter, ed. (2006): *Államok és államkudarcok a globalizálódó világban*. Budapest: Teleki László Intézet Külpolitikai Tanulmányok Központja.

<sup>2</sup> 'International sociological' here is derived from 'international society' as used by Buzan (2004a:202), meaning an interstate society or society of states in which rights are also given to non-state actors (individuals and transnational actors or TNAs) by states, that are still the primary designers of the political and legal framework of interaction.

<sup>3</sup> Meant in a simplifying way as 'mode of speech', implying e.g. having a specific historical narrative.

<sup>4</sup> Buzan identifies two purely physical systems of interaction between states: wars of extermination and relay trade. (Buzan, 2004a:110-111).

<sup>5</sup> That, of course, is an epistemological paradox, for if we could get to objectively know the level of threats, then in the long run we wouldn't have to reckon with the chance of social perception significantly diverging from reality: the objective 'correction' of those perceptions would be possible.

<sup>6</sup> The former may be downloaded at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>; the latter at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> A good example might also be one of the very first articles using the term 'failed state', from 1993: Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner (1993): 'Saving Failed States', *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1993, no.89, 3-20. Helman and Ratner do examine negative external effects of civil wars, but do so merely to point to threats to the immediate neighbourhood of civil war-torn states, as well as to raise the possibility that the Security Council could thus pay more attention to these states as a matter of concern regarding international peace and security. The authors' primarily humanitarian interest is evident in that, too. They want more significance attributed to the subject most of all with the motivation to 'save', as indicated in the title.

<sup>8</sup> The expression is taken from Kenneth Waltz, who uses it in the sense of: behaving in largely the same way and according to similar logic, under the effect of the same structuralising factors.

<sup>9</sup> 'Paradigm' here is meant in the sense of 'pattern'.

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<sup>10</sup> About the legal principle and its application at the time of decolonisation see e.g. Hasani, 2001:94-106.

<sup>11</sup> Boutros-Ghali (1992) writes that 'if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve'.

<sup>12</sup> In Gligorov's original phrase: 'Why should we be a minority in your state, when you can be a minority in our state?' [ironical reference to the problems in the Balkans in general].

<sup>13</sup> At this point, these ideas clash with those of historicists, who, in the cruelty of African wars, may see the analogy of the 30-year war and its brutality in Europe. This shows that thinkers sharing Euro-centrism may arrive at radically different conclusions about issues of significance, which subsequently illustrates the complexity of the discourse on state failure.

<sup>14</sup> The source of income has changed in the case of many guerrilla forces, for instance because of the waning super- and great power financial support after the end of the Cold War. They needed to re-organise their activities re-basing those from then on on local resources. That, in contrast with the earlier external financing which was concentrated in one channel and was thus a significant incentive for centralisation, is now an incentive for fragmentation. Smaller factions may break away, being able to ensure their own survival by looting or the access to certain natural resources, e.g. diamonds.

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